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9

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper with this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78a-4104(2).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the trial court correct to hold that there are no genuine issues

of material fact?
2.

Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment to defendants

on the issue of proximate cause.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The court reviews facts and inferences from those facts in the light most
favorable to the losing party, overturning summary judgment and remanding
the case for further proceedings on issues if it concludes that genuine issue of
material fact exist; where no material facts remain unresolved, the court
examines the trial court's conclusions of law and review them for correctness.
English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154 (UT App. 1989), affirmed 848 P.2d 153
(Utah 1993).
ISSUE PRESERVATION
On December 2, 2010, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal of the district
court's final Order Granting Summary Judgment, entered November 4, 2010 (R.
456, 460).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs sold their home and adjoining land in Washington County to

Pecan Ridge Partners, LLC (hereinafter "Pecan Ridge") (R. 115, 362). In
exchange, the plaintiffs received a trust deed on the property and other
consideration (R. 115, 116, 362).
Atlas Title Insurance Company, Inc. (hereinafter "Atlas Title") performed
the closing on December 5, 2011 (R. 116). At that time, the Hardings executed a
warranty deed to Pecan Ridge, and Pecan Ridge executed a first trust deed on the
property in favor of a group of investors in the amount of $372,713.67, and a
second trust deed in favor of the Hardings in the amount of $800,633.11 (R. 116,
202, 214). The Hardings were told that their trust deed would be recorded the
following day in second position (R. 116, 364). Atlas Title recorded the warranty
deed and the first trust deed the following day, but failed to record the Harding's
trust deed for more than nine months (R. 116,193, 202, 214).
Before the trust deed was recorded, Pecan Ridge had encumbered the
property with two additional trust deeds, recorded on May 7, 2007 and August 17,
2007 (about the time Mr. Harding brought the failure to record the deed to Atlas
Title's attention), to third parties with a principal balance of $1,391,000. Those
trust deeds were also recorded by Atlas Title (R. 116, 218, 222). These additional
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encumbrances completely destroyed the value of the Harding's security interest in
the property (R. 367).
Pecan Ridge thereafter traded the original parcel for a second piece of land.
As part of the transaction, the plaintiffs received a trust deed in second position
on this new property and released their trust deed on the original parcel (R. 117).
The holder of the trust deed in first position foreclosed upon the property in March
of 2009, extinguishing the plaintiffs trust deed (R. 120).
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Fifth District Court of Washington

County, the on May 11, 2009 against Pecan Ridge and Atlas Title (R. 1).
Plaintiffs served Pecan Ridge, Atlas Title and Pecan Ridge, as well as Randy
Kidman and Dave White (employees of Atlas), and Jeremy Larkin and Scott
Wilson (principals of Pecan Ridge) (R. 19, 23, 84, 85, 107, 318). Pecan Ridge did
not file an answer and its default was entered and a judgment entered (R. 39, 104).
Defendants Roger Cater (a former employee of Atlas Title) and Scott Nielson (a
principal of Pecan Ridge) were not served.
The amended complaint included claims for breach of contract against
Pecan Ridge, breach of contact against Atlas Title, breach of good faith and fair
dealing, breach of fiduciary duty against Atlas Title, civil conspiracy, negligence
against Atlas Title and conversion (R. 54).
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The Hardings requested a jury trial (R. 41).
After discovery was completed, the defendants filed two motions for
summary judgment ( R i l l , 125)1. The first motion was in regard to the
conspiracy claims (the Hardings do not contest the dismissal of this claim). The
second motion sought dismissal of the remaining claims on the issue of proximate
cause. The trial court granted both motions and the plaintiffs appealed (R. 456,
460).
The trial court, in its order, held that "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact that might preclude entry of summary judgment and that summary
judgment is appropriate as a matter of law." (R. 457). With respect to the
proximate cause issue, the trial court held that:
Specifically, it is Plaintiffs' burden to prove, with respect to all of
their claims, that the Title Defendants' actions were the proximate
cause of Plaintiff s damages. Plaintiffs did not meet this burden
because determining causation on the facts and evidence presented to
the court could not be done without engaging in impermissible
speculation. (R. 457).
>

On appeal, the Hardings are not disputing the dismissal of the conspiracy claim,
and only seek a review of the proximate cause ruling.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. INITIAL SALE AND FAILURE TO RECORD TRUST DEED

1

The motion was filed by defendants Atlas Title, Kidman and White; defendants
Wilson and Larkin joined in the motion for summary judgment on the conspiracy
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Lynn and Eileen Harding owned property located in Washington County
containing approximately 10 acres. They lived in a home on the property and
conducted their horse business there (R. 115, 362, 375).
The Hardings agreed to sell their home and property to Pecan Ridge, a real
estate development group. The Hardings financed a large portion of the purchase
price for the Initial Property (R. 115). Atlas Title Insurance Company, Inc.
(hereinafter "Atlas Title") performed the closing on December 5, 2011 (R. 116).
At that time, the Hardings executed a warranty deed to Pecan Ridge. Pecan Ridge
executed a first trust deed on the property in favor of a group of investors in the
amount of $372,713.67, and a second trust deed in favor of the Hardings in the
amount of $800,633.11 (R. 116, 202, 214). The Hardings were told that their
trust deed would be recorded the following day in second position (R. 116, 364).
Atlas Title recorded the warranty deed and the first trust deed the following day,
but failed to record the Harding's trust deed for more than nine months (R. 116,
193,202,214).
The Harding attempted to obtain a copy of the papers from the closing and
the recorded deed from Atlas Title during that nine month period, and were told
that the papers would be provided. Finally, Mr. Harding went to the County
recorder in August of 2007 and discovered that the trust deed had not been

claim (R. 347).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law5 Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

recorded (R. 117, 364, 365). After bringing this to Atlas Title's attention, the
Harding's trust deed was finally recorded on September 11, 2007 (R. 117, 366,
367).
Before the Harding's trust deed was recorded, Pecan Ridge had encumbered
the property with two additional trust deeds, recorded on May 7, 2007 and August
17, 2007 (about the time Mr. Harding brought the failure to record the deed to
Atlas Title's attention), to third parties. The principal balance of these two
intervening trust deeds was $1,391,000. Those trust deeds were also recorded by
Atlas Title (R. 116, 218,222). These additional encumbrances completely
destroyed the value of the Harding's security interest in the property (R.367).
2.

TRANSACTIONS FOLLOWING RECORDING OF TRUST

DEED
As part of a separate transaction, not related to the sale of the original
parcel, plaintiff Pecan Ridge executed a second trust deed and note in favor of the
Hardings (R. 117, 367). The Harding's second note had a principal balance of
$750,000, and the trust deed was recorded on a second parcel of property on
September 27, 2011 (R. 117).
In April of 2008, Pecan Ridge engaged in a real estate exchange whereby it
transferred the two properties encumbered by the Harding's trust deeds in
exchange for a third parcel (R. 117). The Harding received a trust deed and note
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on this third parcel, with a principal balance of $1,550,633.10, the total unpaid
balance of the two prior trust deed notes (R. 117, 118). The Hardings understood
that their new trust deed would be in second position on the new property (R.
118).
The Hardings executed requests for reconveyance of the two prior trust
deeds at that time, and Atlas Title, as trustee, executed and recorded the
reconveyances (R. 117, 253, 256).
The Pecan Ridge development failed, perhaps due in part due to the
collapsing real estate market in Washington County, and the trust deed in superior
position to plaintiffs' final trust deed was foreclosed in March of 2009 (R. 119,
120), eliminating the Harding's secured interest in the third property. The
Hardings filed this action two months later (R. 1).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court failed to recognize that there are genuine issues of material
fact with respect to at least three of defendant's factual assertions.
The trial court granted summary judgment on the issue of causation as it
essentially decided that there may were other contributing factors to the Hardings'
loss. Rather than requiring the defendant to prove that Atlas Title's neglect was
not a possible cause of the Hardings' injury, the trial court instead essentially
required the Hardings to show that Atlas Title's neglect was the sole cause of the
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loss. Case law in Utah prohibits trial courts from deciding the issue of causation
on such a basis.
ARGUMENT
A.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment procedure is generally considered drastic remedy,

should be granted with reluctance and requires strict compliance with rule
authorizing it. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah
1993); Houslv v. Anaconda Co., 427 P.2d 390 (Utah 1967). Summary judgment is
a drastic remedy and courts should be reluctant to deprive litigants of an
opportunity to fully present their contentions upon a trial, and therefore, summary
judgment should be granted only when under the facts viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff he could not recover as a matter of law. Welchman v.
Wood, 337 P.2d 410 (Utah 1959). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and
should be granted with reluctance. Houslev v. Anaconda Co.. 427 P.2d 390 (Utah
1967).
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Gardner v. Board of County Com'rs of Wasatch County, 178 P.3d 893 (Utah
2008). Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to court before judgment
can be rendered against them unless it is obviousfromevidence before court that
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party opposing judgment can establish no right to recovery. Drvsdale v. Ford
Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678 (Utah 1997). In view of constitutional guarantee of
access to the courts for protection of rights and redress of wrongs, summary
judgment, which denies opportunity for trial, should be granted only when it
clearly appears that there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against
could prevail. Utah Const. Art. 1, § 11. Utah State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982)
It is not purpose of summary judgment procedure to judge credibility of
averments of parties or witnesses, or the weight of evidence, nor is it to deny
parties right to trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Kilpatrick v. Wiley. Rein &
Fielding. 1996, 909 P.2d 1283, certiorari denied 919 P.2d 1208. If there is any
dispute as to any issue material to settlement of controversy, summary judgment
should not be granted. Holbrook Co. v. Adams. 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975).
The judge hearing a summary judgment motion may not draw fact
inferences as to the moving party's purpose or intention; such inferences may only
be drawn at trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). Goodnow v. Sullivan, 44 P.3d 704
(Utah 2002). Contentions of the party opposing the motion must be considered in
a light most advantageous to him and go to trial. Controlled Receivables, Inc. v.
Harriman. 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966). Essentially, summary judgment is only
appropriate when it is clear from the undisputed facts that the opposing party
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law9 Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cannot prevail. Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1987).
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court gives no
deference to the district court's conclusions of law, and reviews them for
correctness. Grvnberg v. Ouestar Pipeline Co.. 70 P.3d 1 (Utah 2003).
B.

DISPUTED FACTS
Despite the assertion of the trial court to the contrary, there were material

facts presented by Atlas Title that were disputed by the Hardings. While the facts
given in paragraphs 4 of Atlas Title's motion was disputed, they are not
necessarily material. Only an inference was disputed in paragraph 12 of Atlas
Title's facts. However, the facts and inferences from the facts set forth below
were disputed and were material.
1.

FACT #6

Atlas Title's undisputed fact number six provided that:
The Hardings' trust deed note was to be secured by a trust deed
recorded against the Initial Property. The Hardings did not provide
Atlas Title with written recording instructions regarding the recording
of the trust deed against the Initial Property.
(R. 116). The Hardings responded as follows:
Plaintiffs deny the second sentence of this paragraph. First,
plaintiffs object that the citations to the record do not support that
conclusion. The Trust Deed would not contain any closing
instructions, and Request No. 70 of Exhibit 9 is a response to request
for admissions, unverified and not given in the form of an unsworn
declaration, and is therefore hearsay. Denying a request for
admission is not evidence.
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Plaintiffs assert that they did provide closing instructions, and
state as additional facts that they were assured by Atlas Title that the
recording would take place the morning after the closing:
a.
At closing, plaintiffs signed a document which included
recording instructions. It was prepared by Atlas Title. It said that
their trust deed was to be recorded within 72 hours. Plaintiffs were
verbally told by the Atlas representative that it would take
approximately 3 days to get the recorded deed back to them. They
were told Atlas Title that it would actually be recorded in the morning
following the closing. Atlas Title told plaintiffs that they were going
to give plaintiffs copies of these documents, as well as the title policy
and many other documents they signed, within three days.
b.
Plaintiffs were charged for a title policy. See
defendant's exhibit 6, line 1108. Plaintiffs were also told by Atlas
Title in a letter that Atlas had provided title insurance.
c.
Plaintiffs requested in discovery that Atlas admit that tile
insurance was provided, which Atlas denied, and requested a copy of
these closing documents as well as the title policy. See Defendant
Atlas Title's Insurance Agency, Inc., Answer to Plaintiffs First
Discovery Request, response to request for admissions #3 and
response to request for production of documents #17, 18, 19 and 20.
Atlas provided nothing.
(R. 362-3). It is clearfromthis evidence that Atlas Title as provided closing
instructions, but did not give copies to the Hardings.
2.

FACT #8

Atlas Title's undisputed fact number eight provided that:
The Hardings trust deed was to be recorded after the Goodman et al.
trust deed, in second lien position on the Initial Property, but-through
inadvertence-it was not immediately recorded by Atlas Title.
(R. 116). The Hardings responded as follows:
Plaintiffs deny that it was through inadvertence that the trust deed was not
immediately recorded by Atlas Title. The citations to the record do not
support that conclusion. The Trust Deed does not contain any information
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Lawi]Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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on why the trust deed was not recorded for nine months, and the response to
interrogatories states that "As best at Atlas Title can tell, it was inadvertence
on the part of the employee whose duty it was to record documents for Atlas
Title." That is not evidence that it was inadvertence, only a statement of
probability or a guess.
Plaintiffs assert that it was not inadvertence with the following facts:
a.
The first position trust deed was recorded the day following the
closing, September 6, 2007, just plaintiffs were told their trust deed would be
recorded the following day.
b.
Three days after the closing, Lynn Harding called Atlas title to see if he
could come and pick up the deed. They said they did not have it yet but they
would get it to the Hardings.
c.
Two weeks after the closing, Lynn Harding went to Atlas Title.
Someone new was in the office, and they said they would have to wait to get
back to the Hardings until the person in charge was backfromChristmas
vacation.
d.
Eileen Harding called Atlas Title during the second week in January.
She was told that Atlas would get a copy to the Hardings.
e.
After that, Lynn Harding called Atlas Title eight or ten times,
approximately once per month, to get a copy of the recorded deed. They told
him every time that they would get it to him.
f.
Eileen Harding stopped by twice at the Atlas Office to get a copy of the
recorded deed, and was told that it would be sent to the Hardings.
g.
Lynn Harding stopped by the Atlas Office approximately six times, and
was told that the deed would be sent to the Hardings. He remembers talking
to Randy Kidman in particular on several occasions.
h.
Lynn Harding was at the title company as part of transactions with
adjoining properties, and always requested a copy of the recorded deed.
i.
There were various excuses given for why the deed could not be
provided by Atlas, including that they couldn't find the right file, that Randy
was on vacation, that the file was not at that office, or that the guy who
records the documents had the file with him.
j.
Finally, Lynn Harding went to the county recorder to just get a copy of
the recorded deed in late August of 2007. At that time he found out that the
deed had not been recorded.
k.
Lynn Harding immediately went to Atlas Title. Lynn Harding was
told that it was a slip-up and that they would take care of it. At that time,
Lynn Harding asked for titled his title insurance and closing instructions, and
was told that they didn't have a copy of either document.
1.
Eileen Harding called during the first week in September, asking for a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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copy of the deed. Atlas Title said they would fax it to her.
m. Eilenn Harding called the following week, and the recorded deed was
faxed to her the next day.
n.
There were additional deeds recorded on the "Initial Property" between
the time of the Hardings' closing and when their trust deed was finally
recorded. See defendant's exhibit #12 and 13. These closings were
performed by Atlas Title and Atlas Title served as the Trustee of the trust
deeds. As stated above, the Hardings requested copies of the closing
documents in discovery for these transactions, and Atlas did not provide
them.
(R. 363-5) While the Hardings can point to no conclusive evidence that the failure
to record the deed was intentional, there clearly is enough evidence, and
inferences from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Hardings, to conclude that the failure to record the deed was more than
inadvertence.
3.

FACT #10

Atlas Title's undisputed fact number ten provided that:
Sometime in August or September 2007, the Hardings brought it to
Atlas Title's attention that their trust deed was not recorded. After
confirming this, Atlas Title immediately recorded the trust deed.
(R. 117). The Hardings responded as follows:
Plaintiffs deny the second sentence of this paragraph. First,
plaintiffs object that the citations to the record do not support that
conclusion. The Trust Deed would not contain any information
regarding when the Hardings found out that their trust deed had not
been recorded, and paragraph 65 of Exhibit 9 is a response to request
for admissions, unverified and not given in the form of an unsworn
declaration, and is therefore hearsay. Denying a request for
admission is not evidence. Further, the response states that:
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Atlas Title was not made aware of the failure to record until it was
brought to their attention by Plaitniff Lynn Harding sometime in
September 2007. Therefore, Atlas Title must deny because it did not
notify Plainiff of the recording issue. Nowhere in this statement does
it state the recording took place immediately after Atlas was notified
of the problem.
Plaintiffs assert that the deed was not immediately recorded
after the problem was brought to Atlas' attention with the following
facts:
a.
Lynn Harding went to the county recorder to just get a
copy of the recorded deed in late August of 2007. At that time he
found out that the deed had not been recorded.
b.
Lynn Harding immediately went to Atlas Title. Lynn
Harding was told that it was a slip-up and that they would take care of
it.
c.
Eileen Harding called during the first week in September,
asking for a copy of the deed. Atlas Title said they would fax it to her.
d.
Eilenn Harding called the following week, and the
recorded deed was faxed to her the next day.
(R. 366, 367). The trust deed was eventually recorded a couple of weeks after
Mr. Harding contacted Atlas Title, but it was not done "immediately."
C.

PROXIMATE CAUSE AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1.

COURTS DISFAVOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE

ISSUE OF CAUSATION
Utah case law is replete with warnings to trial courts against granting
summary judgment on the issue of causation.
Generally, the question of proximate cause raises an issue of fact "to be
submitted to the jury for its determination." Mitchell v. Pearson Enters.. 607 P.2d
240, 245-6 (Utah 1985). It is well established that the question of proximate cause

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
14
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

is generally reserved for the jury. Godeskv v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 544
(Utah 1984); Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah
App.1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Only in rare cases may a trial
judge rule as a matter of law on the issue of proximate causation. Steffensen v.
Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1991).
Summary judgments are more frequently given in contract cases
because of greater ease in determining the factual issues....
However, when it comes to determining negligence, contributory
negligence, and causation, courts are not in such a good position . . .
here enters prerogative of the jury to make a determination . . . Did
the conduct of a party measure up to that of the reasonably prudent
man, and, if not, was it a proximate cause of the harm done?
Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126 at 128 (Utah 1967).
Proximate cause is that cause which, in the natural and continuous
sequence (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the
efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors
that accomplish the injury.
Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund, 83 P.3d 391 at 14 (UT App. 2003). The
proximate cause in this case is Atlas Title's failure to record the deed. That
was the event which produced the injury. That "a trial judge ordinarily
may not determine the issue of proximate cause is fully supported by Utah
case law." Id. at 3 (Utah App. 2003) (emphasis in original); Harris v. Utah
Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983).
Although summary judgment may on occasion be appropriate in cases
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where proximate cause is an issue, it is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case.
Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987). As the Court of Appeals
recited in Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (UT App. 2001),
1292:
Generally, causation "cannot be resolved as a matter of law."
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992). "Proximate
cause is an issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence upon
which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary judgment
appropriate." Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 600 (Utah App.)
(citations omitted), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). In other
words, Utah litigants do not easily dispose of the element of causation
on summary judgment.
Causation is a highly fact-sensitive element of any cause of action. In
Utah, "[pjroximate causation is '[t]hat cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred.' " Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 106 (citations omitted). To
establish causation, plaintiffs must persuade a fact finder that their
injury was a natural result of the defendant's breach. Plaintiffs
therefore must spin together myriad facts into a durable thread that
reasonably connects defendant's breach to plaintiffs' injury. Utah
courts have recognized that "[fjact-sensitive cases ... do not lend
themselves to a determination on summary judgment." Draper City v.
Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995). "
The Supreme Court held in Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992)
reversed summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause "[bjecause proximate
cause is an issue of fact, we refuse to take it from the jury if there is any evidence
upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation." (emphasis added).
Summary judgment on the issue of causation is not possible even where a
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third-party criminal actor intervenes. Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury. Inc..
909 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah 1996) (determining that when car dealership has
history of thefts and yet continues to keep keys in cars and does nothing to
improve security, it may be foreseeable that a thief would steal a car, drive
recklessly while being pursued by police, and injure a bystander); Mitchell v.
Pearson Enters.. 697 P.2d 240,246-47 (Utah 1985) (holding on proper facts hotel's
inaction in providing security could be proximate cause of wrongful death of
patron killed by intruder); Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482,
489 (Utah App.1991) (concluding injury to customer during chase of shoplifter
could be a foreseeable consequence of negligent training of personnel in pursuit of
shoplifters), aff d, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993).
In Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 611 P.2d 363
(Utah 1980), the trial judge granted defendant summary judgment on the issue of
proximate cause in an action where the plaintiff had been injured in an automobile
accident. The plaintiff claimed he was unable to see approaching traffic in
executing a left-hand turn because a van owned by the defendant utility company
negligently blocked his view by remaining in the intersection, and this was an
intervening proximate cause of the accident. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
reversed the summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause. The court held
that the issue of proximate cause may only be takenfromthe jury where
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reasonable minds could not differ as to what "was or was not the proximate cause
of the injury." Id. at 365 n. 4. The court concluded that" in a situation involving
independent intervening cause, the primary issue is one of the foreseeability of the
subsequent negligent conduct of a third person, and in this case, [the issue of
proximate cause] must be resolved by the finder of fact." Id at 365.
In Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983), the
passenger of a jeep brought an action against a bus company and the jeep driver
for injuries sustained in a traffic accident. The trial court granted the bus company
a directed verdict, instructing the jury that if they found the jeep driver should
have observed the bus prior to the accident, they must find, as a matter of law, that
the jeep driver was the sole proximate cause of the accident. On appeal, the
plaintiff claimed that a jury could infer that the bus negligently contributed to the
accident and pointed to allegations that the bus stopped too rapidly, failed to drive
out of the lane of traffic, and had faulty brake lights. Id. at 220. The Utah Supreme
Court agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the directed verdict. The Harris court
held it improper for the trial judge to have taken the issue of proximate cause from
the jury. The court explained: "Where the evidence is in dispute including the
inferences from the evidence, the issue should be submitted to the jury." Id
2.

IMPERMISSIBLE SPECULATION

Atlas Title and the court seemed to rely principally on language form the the
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case ofHalinev. Barker. 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996). In that case, the plaintiff
brought an action against his bankruptcy attorneys for malpractice, as a
bankruptcy court had refused to discharge in bankruptcy due to omissions and
inaccuracies in his submissions to the court. The court there held that the issue of
proximate cause could be decided by summary judgment in certain limited
circumstances:
proximate cause issues can be decided as a matter of law when a
determination of the facts falls on either of two opposite ends of a
factual continuum. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate (i) when
the facts are so clear that reasonable persons could not disagree about
the underlying facts or about the application of a legal standard to the
facts, and (ii) when the proximate cause of an injury is left to
speculation so that the claim fails as a matter of law.
Harline v. Barker 912 P.2d 433 at 439 (Utah 1996). See also Berenda v. Langford
914 P.2d 45 Utah 1996. Trial courts are not permitted to speculate about the facts,
but must take them as theyfindthem.
However, the basis for the right must be evident from the facts as they exist.
Glover cannot establish the basis for the right by merely speculating that
under a different organizational structure the BSA and the Council could
have retained the right to control scoutmasters at regular troop meetings.
Such speculation is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for
purposes of a summary judgment motion.
Glover by and through Dyson v. Boy Scouts of Ameirca, 923 P.2d 1383 (utah
1996).
At the hearing, counsel for Atlas Title argued that the Hardings should not
recover because of the economy collapsed ("That's the proximate cause of their
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damages") (Transcript, 21). He also stated that the Hardings should have
submitted a claim to Atlas Title's underwriter at the time the initial failure to
record the deed was discovered, instead of later relinquishing their trust deed
(Transcript, 22)2. Essentially, the Harding's damages were caused by the larger
economy or their own mistakes. This is an interesting argument that should be
made to the jury, but which is exactly the 'impermissible speculation" that the
Harline case prohibits. Clearly, the economy did suffer, but what role that has in
this action needs to be proved to a jury. Just as clearly, the Hardings should have
obtained counsel and taken action sooner to recover for their losses. However,
they would not have been in that position but for the failures of Atlas Title to
record the deed. If the Hardings failed to mitigate damages or contributed to the
loss, the jury needs to determine the extent of the Harding's fault and what effect
that has on damages.
Harline essentially argues that there is not causation where the action of the
defendant had no impact on the injury. The trial court's interpretation seems to be
that there is no causation where there may be other factors that led to the injury.
Harline is clear that summary judgment is not appropriate in these circumstances.

2

This was not really possible, as Atlas Title did not provide copies of the tile
policy or any other documents to the Hardings, despite their repeated requests.
Atlas denied in discovery that it provided insurance for the transaction, even
though it charged the Hardings for insurance in the closing, and did not provide to
the Hardings any information regarding the alleged insurance despite a request for
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The trial court cannot decide which cause it feels was the primary one and rule on
that basis on summary judgment, it can only grant summary judgment if the
defendant's neglect was unrelated to the injury.
That the trial court turned the burden on its head can be seen in the court's
ruling. The court held that "it is Plaintiffs' burden to prove, with respect to all of
their claims, that the Title Defendants' actions were the proximate cause of
Plaintiffs damages. (R. 457). This may be true at trial, but on summary judgment
it is Atlas Title's burden to show that the Atlas Title was not the proximate cause
of the injury. This was simply not possible under Utah law.
Here, defendant Atlas Title failed to record a trust deed for nine months. In
the interim, two other trust deeds were recorded on the property. This destroyed
the value of the security (R. 367). The plaintiffs were presented with the
opportunity to possibly recoup the damages they suffered, at least partially, due to
Atlas Title's failure by moving their security interest to another property. As
stated by the Hardings in response to the motion for summary judgment, they
never would have released their original trust deed if it had been recorded in a
timely manner (R. 367). But for Atlas Title's failure to record, the plaintiffs would
never have agreed to release their deed.
If they had been in second position on the original property as they should

production of documents(R. 363-365).
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have been, they would have had the resources to redeem the original property (R.
367). They only released their original trust deed because it had become worthless
due to Atlas Title's failure to record (R. 368). They attempted to collect the debt
they were owed by moving it from the original property to another that might be of
value, or least in the hope that moving the indebtedness would at least assist Pecan
Ridge to recover and fulfill its obligations (R. 368). The effort nevertheless failed,
but just because the Hardings' attempted to save their asset Atlas Title should not
be allowed to escape liability for the problem it caused by failing to record the
deed.
D.

NEGLECT AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs' complaint includes a cause of action against Atlas Title for

neglect. Summary judgment should be granted in such cases with great reluctance.
Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985). Only in the most
clear-cut cases is summary judgment appropriate in negligence matters. Ingram v.
Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987); Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434
(Utah 1982).
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, plaintiffs pray that the court reverse the trial court's Order
Granting Summary Judgment, and remand the case to the district court for jury
trial.
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Dated this 7th day of November, 2011.

Samuel G. Draper, attorney for plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was placed in the United States mail at St. George,
Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the 7th day of November,
2011, addressed as follows:

Bryan J. Pattison
Durham Jones & Pinegar, PC
192 East 200 North, Third Floor
St. George, UT 84770
Heath H. Snow
Bingham & Snow, LLP
230 North 1680 East, Building M
St. George, UT 84790
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Bryan J. Pattison (8766)

BY.

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

192 East 200 North, Third Floor
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 674-0400
Facsimile: (453)628-1610
Attorneys for Defendants
Atlas Title Insurance Agency, Inc., Randy Kidman, and Dave White
42879.00

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LYNN HARDING and EILEEN HARDING,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
PECAN RIDGE PARTNERS, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company, ATLAS TITLE
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah
corporation, SCOTT WILSON, JEREMY
LARKIN, SCOTT NIELSON, RANDY
KIDMAN, DAVE WHITE and ROGER
CATER and JOHN DOES, 1 through 9,

Case No. 090501506
Judge James L. Shumate

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on Defendants Atlas Title Insurance Agency, Inc.,
Randy Kidman, and Dave White (collectively "Title Defendants") motions for summary
judgment addressing (i) all claims for lack of causation and (ii) the civil conspiracy claim on the
merits. Defendants Scott Wilson and Jeremy Larkin joined in the Title Defendants' motion for
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The Court held a hearing on the motions on October 19,2010. Having reviewed and
considered the parties' memoranda and argument, the Court concludes that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact that might preclude entry of summary judgment and that summary
judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. Specifically, it is Plaintiffs' burden to prove, with
respect to all of their claims, that the Title Defendants' actions were the proximate cause of
Plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs did not meet this burden because determining causation on the
facts and evidence presented could not be done without engaging in impermissible speculation.
Therefore, summary judgment is granted as to all claims asserted against the Title Defendants
and Defendants Scott Wilson and Jeremy Larkin. Summary judgment is also appropriate as to
Plaintiffs' claim for civil conspiracy as no clear and convincing evidence has been produced on
which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Plaintiffs meet each of the elements of a civil
conspiracy.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the motions for summary judgment and
dismisses Plaintiffs' claims against the Title Defendants, Scott Wilson, and Jeremy Larkin.

DATED this 2 l 3

da

y of
2010.
BY THE COURT:

jAitfis'L. SHUMATE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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